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Political Connections and Business Strategy: The Impact of Types and Destinations of 





This paper studies how different types and destinations of connections between business 
leaders and political actors create strategic benefits in closed and open political economic 
systems. The analysis examines how political ties facilitate diversification by business groups 
in Taiwan between 1986 and 1998, before and after the country underwent extensive political 
and economic liberalization that led to changes in diffusion of power, tie accountability, and 
public scrutiny. We show that formal position interlocks with the dominant party or senior 
government officials provide the greatest strategic benefits in a closed political economic 
system, while informal social ties to a wider range of political actors provide greater strategic 
benefits when a political economic system becomes more open.  
  1
The political connections literature typically argues that firms with political ties gain 
strategic benefits such as regulatory favors and investment resources (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 
2006). However, the existing literature has three gaps. First, although the literature sometimes 
distinguishes between different types and destinations of political ties (Johnson and Mitton, 
2003; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), studies typically do not discuss how different types 
and destinations of ties will have different impacts in different political economic contexts. 
Second, the literature historically focused on descriptive arguments and/or industry and 
country studies (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1972; MacIntyre, 1994; Evans, 1995; Schneider, 
1998; Wank, 2002), only recently beginning to examine the impact of connections between 
individual business leaders and political actors (e.g., Faccio, 2006; Siegel, 2007). Third, the 
literature most commonly focuses on business performance, with only limited examination of 
firms' underlying business strategies. This paper addresses these gaps by studying business 
diversification strategy in an emerging market economy, arguing that the relative strategic 
benefits of formal position interlocks and informal social ties to dominant political parties, 
government officials, and legislators change as a closed political economic context becomes 
more open. 
Political connections are linkages between individual business leaders and political 
actors such as party leaders, senior government officials, and elected legislators (Fisman, 
2001; Siegel, 2007). This definition reflects the idea in the social networks literature that 
interpersonal linkages can serve as conduits of resources and influence (Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 1985), while recognizing the differences in destinations of ties driven by the 
heterogeneity of political actors (Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel, 1981; Knoke, 1990). Political ties 
may involve formal position interlocks in which business leaders serve as political actors 
(Faccio, 2006), or may involve informal social linkages between corporate leaders and 
friends, family, or classmates who hold political posts (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and 
Thesmar, 2004; Siegel, 2007). Political ties commonly create strategic benefits for connected  2
firms, where strategic benefits are resources that a firm can use to facilitate its business 
activities. 
We argue that the strategic benefits of different types and destinations of political ties 
will vary in open and closed political economic systems, where open and closed systems 
differ in the extent of political and market liberalization that a country has undergone at a 
given time. We predict that formal position interlocks to political actors with direct influence 
on resource allocation, such as party leaders and senior government officials, will be 
particularly beneficial for business diversification in closed political economic systems, but 
that the benefits will decline as a political economic system becomes more open. In parallel, 
we argue that informal social ties to a wider range of political actors (including political 
actors with more indirect influence on resource allocation, such as elected legislators) will 
offer increasing benefits for business diversification as a political economic system becomes 
more open. The differences arise because of differences in tie accountability, diffusion of 
power, and public scrutiny in different political economic contexts. 
The empirical analysis focuses on diversification by the 100 largest business groups in 
Taiwan between 1986 and 1998, before and during a period when the country underwent 
extensive economic and political liberalization. Business groups are firms that operate in 
multiple industries, which are linked to each other through financial, managerial, and 
operating interlocks (Granovetter, 2005; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). The flagship firms in 
many industries in emerging economies are members of business groups, which collectively 
produce significant portions of national GDP and influence the direction of national 
development through their expansion choices (Khanna, 2000; Fisman and Khanna, 2004; 
Granovetter, 1995). Diversification by business groups is an important strategic activity that 
has a major impact on economic development in their countries. At the same time, group 
owners and business executives commonly have strong ties with political actors in their 
countries (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). This research design allows us to focus on  3
the impact of political ties on diversification strategy at different stages of political economic 
development within a country, thereby providing insights that are relevant to many countries 
that are undergoing structural changes in political and market institutions (Huntington, 1991; 
Sachs and Warner, 1995).  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
The Significance of Business Diversification in Emerging Economies 
Diversification is an important element of business strategy, with impact on both 
corporate evolution and social welfare. Firms diversify into new product markets for multiple 
reasons, including extending existing resources (Penrose, 1959; Montgomery, 1994), market 
expansion (Rumelt, 1974; Wernerfelt, 1984), and managerial empire building (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Diversification – whether related or unrelated – can either improve or 
damage corporate performance in both developed (Montgomery and Singh, 1984) and 
developing economies (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).  
Beyond the corporate level, diversification by multi-business firms plays an important 
role in the mobilization and distribution of resources throughout a country, particularly during 
developmental stages. Economic theory and data show that the process of industrialization 
often causes developing countries to first broaden their industrial production base in order to 
mobilize resources, diversify risk, and provide greater consumption opportunities before the 
countries eventually specialize in order to take advantage of economies of scale (Acemoglu 
and Zilbibotti, 1997; Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003). Whereas industrial transformation in 
developed market economies is often led by new entrants (Mansfield, 1996), the absence of 
well-developed market institutions in many emerging economies implies that established 
firms are the primary actors with infrastructure available to mobilize financial, technical, and 
managerial resources needed to expand the industrial base in an emerging market (Khanna 
and Palepu, 1999). Hence, firm diversification often contributes to economic development in 
emerging economies (Leff, 1978; Amsden, 2001). Examples include Germany and England  4
in the 19th century, the U.S. and Scandinavia in the early 20th century, Japan in the mid-20th 
century, South and East Asian economies such as India, Korea, and Taiwan in the late 20th 
century, and Southeast Asian economies such as Malaysia in the 21st century.  
Of course, diversification by established firms is not always positive for an economy. 
Ultimately, as an industrial base expands in an emerging economy, diversification activities 
of multi-business firms in emerging economies may also preempt use of scarce business 
resources such as capital, technology, and talent and thereby become counter-productive 
(Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). Even during developmental periods, there is no 
assurance that diversification by a given firm will create economic benefits because of factors 
ranging from firm-level idiosyncrasies to government policies to industry infrastructure 
(Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004). We seek to shed light on how different forms of political ties 
facilitate diversification strategy in different political economic contexts, as a step towards 
providing a deeper understanding of how business entities create and manage resources at 
different stages of institutional development.  
Diversification Benefits from Political Ties in Closed and Open Institutional Contexts 
Political ties often provide firms with preferred access to legal support, financial 
resources, and other strategic benefits. We refer to diversification benefits as strategic benefits 
that allow a firm to increase its diversification from one period to the next.  
Political ties offer strategic benefits generally, and diversification benefits in particular, 
in both closed and open political economic contexts. Relatively closed economies are 
countries in which heavy regulations on business entry and other forms of economic activity 
are abundant (e.g., the Soviet Union until the 1990s and Cuba today), while open economies 
are countries with only limited regulatory constraints on business activity (e.g., the U.S., the 
U.K., and Chile today) (Sachs and Warner, 1995). In parallel with closed and open economies, 
closed polities are countries in which there is a single dominant party and/or ruler (e.g., the 
Communist Party in Soviet Union before the 1990s, the PRI in Mexico for much of the 20
th  5
century) that has overwhelming power in the political system and suppresses political 
competition (Almond and Powell, 2004). By contrast, an open polity is one in which two or 
more political parties actively vie for electoral success, such as the United States, Korea, and 
Taiwan today (Almond and Powell, 2004). Although open versus closed is a matter of degree 
rather than a dichotomy, we will discuss polar cases in order to highlight their characteristics. 
The following discussion addresses polities and economies separately, because economic and 
political liberalization can occur concurrently or at different rates in a particular country.  
First, consider diversification benefits of political ties in closed economies and more 
open economies. Political ties facilitate business diversification in closed economies. In such 
economies, ties to powerful political actors offer businesses access to privileged resources 
such as information, government contracts, bank loans (Khwaja and Mian, 2005), favorable 
regulatory conditions such as entry permits (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001), and technology 
that firms can use to pursue new business opportunities (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Peng, 
Lee and Wang, 2005). Kock and Guillen (2001) suggest that multi-business firms in emerging 
economies seek to link to domestic regulators for resources and permits, thus shaping 
diversification patterns in tightly controlled environments.  
Political ties continue to have value for diversification as an economy becomes more 
open, even as regulatory constraints decline and competitive forces increase. In transitional 
economies, the state will continue to have information, resources, administrative privileges, 
and favors to distribute when state enterprises and monopoly industries start to open to 
competition, because there is often a time lag between the removal of red tape and the 
establishment of efficient market institutions (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). For example, a 
well-functioning financial market needs rating agencies, financial press, investment banks, 
and venture capitalists, all of which require an effective legal system and transparent political 
environment – institutions which often take time to develop (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). 
Therefore, political ties often assist business strategy in closed and more open economic  6
stages. Indeed, political networks create conduits for resources even in well-established 
market economies, in which access to information, financial investments, and regulatory 
favors continue to be valuable (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, 1972; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 
1997). Research on political action committees in the U.S., for instance, demonstrates their 
impact on political decisions that support business strategy (Burris, 2001; Clawson, Neustadtl, 
and Scott, 1993). 
Now turn to the diversification benefits of political ties in closed and open political 
systems. In a closed political system, centralization of political power means that a dominant 
party and key appointed officials act as the dispensers of resources necessary for critical 
business activities such as diversification. Examples include Golkar in Suharto’s Indonesia, 
UMNO (United Malays’ National Organization) under Mahathir’s Malaysia, and the KMT 
(Kuomintang) during Chiang’s Taiwan. Qualitative evidence indicates that political parties 
played important roles in shaping which companies were able to grow and diversify 
(Friedland, 1990; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). 
Under a more open political system, with multiple parties and general elections, actors 
throughout the political structure often seek resources from businesses and, in turn, influence 
the flow of resources that businesses can use for diversification and other business strategy. 
Leaders of large businesses often become highly sought-after patrons for political parties due 
to the many potential voters (e.g., employees, subcontractors, customers) they can mobilize 
as well as the large amount of cash they can contribute (Hillman, 1999; Hillman and Hitt, 
1999; Morck and Yeung, 2004); in turn, the parties can provide resources that support the 
continued growth of the businesses. Rose-Ackerman (1999) found that state-business 
relationships based on patronage increased rather than declined in countries such as Russia 
after democratization and deregulation began to take place, due to the growth in pluralistic 
political power and electoral systems. In Taiwan, meanwhile, Cheng and Chu (2002:196) 
found that “the KMT party and many leading business groups began to cement an alliance for  7
mutual benefits” after political liberalization began to take hold in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  
Thus, political ties can provide resources that support business diversification in 
varied political economic systems. Nonetheless, predicting how particular political ties will 
influence business strategy in different political economic contexts requires unpacking the 
effects of different types of ties with different political actors. 
Types and Destinations of Political Ties 
The social network literature highlights the distinction between formal position 
interlocks and informal social relationships (Mizruchi, 1996; Uzzi, 1997; Lin, 2001). Formal 
position interlocks arise when the same person occupies two distinct positions, thereby 
creating a linkage between different domains. An example would be a major corporate 
shareholder who is also a central figure of the dominant political party or government. In 
Taiwan, for instance, Koo Chenfu, the chairman of the China Trust Group, was a member of 
KMT Central Standing Committee during Chiang Kaishek's presidency. In Italy, as another 
example, Silvio Berlusconi, who held office as prime minister from 1994-1995 and 2001-
2006, at the same time owned a media empire including three nationwide commercial 
television stations, a prominent newspaper, and Italy’s largest publishing company. 
By contrast, informal social ties are based on face-to-face interactions involving 
different people (Adler and Kwon, 2002). An informal political tie in our setting would be a 
friendship between a corporate leader and a leading political figure, such as the friendship 
between Koo Chenfu and Li Denghui (the fourth KMT President of Taiwan) through a golf 
club. An example in the U.S. would be the friendship between former President Bill Clinton 
and Vernon Jordan, who served as a board member on about a dozen Fortune 500 companies.  
Social network studies suggest that formal position interlocks and informal social ties 
have different advantages and disadvantages (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1996; 
Adler and Kwon, 2002). From the point of view of the business leader, the main advantage of  8
position interlocks over informal social ties is that the interlocks provide greater tie 
accountability, by limiting principle-agent conflict. Accountability is the degree to which 
political actors can be held responsible for their actions (Almond and Powell, 2004); in our 
context, tie accountability is the degree to which business executives can ensure that political 
actors will fulfill their agreements. With position interlocks, there is no principal-agent 
problem between the business executive and political actor because the principal (corporate 
executive) and the agent (politician) are the same person. Agreements made via social ties, by 
contrast, are more difficult to enforce. Informal social ties typically need to be regularly 
updated through gift or favor exchanges, as well as via face-to-face interactions such as 
banquets and weddings (Yang, 1994; Uzzi, 1997), which may create ambiguity, disagreement, 
and conflict. Hence, the actors involved in social ties may find it difficult to hold each other 
accountable.  
By contrast, the main benefit of informal social ties is that they are more 
inconspicuous than formal position interlocks (Adler and Kwon, 2002). The unobtrusiveness 
makes it more difficult for actors who are concerned about potential biases in resource 
allocation, such as the public media and market analysts, to track the existence and impact of 
political ties. Hence, informal social ties tend to face less public scrutiny from the media and 
other observers than formal position interlocks. 
In addition to types of ties, the social network literature suggests a further distinction 
based on destinations of ties, due to the different resources and power that the connectors 
carry (Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel, 1981; Lin, 2001). In the context of political ties, it is useful to 
contrast destinations that have direct influence on resources flows with actors that have more 
indirect influence. Political actors with direct influence include leaders of the dominant party 
and senior government officials, while actors with indirect influence include legislators in 
national and local assemblies. Party leaders in the dominant political party have direct 
influence on resource allocation because they set agendas concerning the development and  9
implementation of regulatory frameworks that facilitate or inhibit diversification. Senior 
government officials also have direct influence on resource allocation because they make 
day-to-day decisions about awarding licenses, investment credits, and other benefits (Pye, 
1997). By contrast, legislators have more indirect influence on resource allocation through 
their activities in shaping laws, regulations, and financial benefits (Pross, 1985). In turn, the 
strategic benefits of different destinations of ties will depend upon the diffusion of power 
among different political actors, where diffusion of power is the degree to which different 
actors can influence key decisions such as bestowing political resources (Strange, 1996), 
which will vary by institutional context.  
DIVERSIFICATION BENEFITS IN DIFFERENT POLITICAL ECONOMIC 
CONTEXTS  
The previous section suggests that the strategic benefits of specific types of political 
ties depend on the level of tie accountability of political actors and the level of public scrutiny 
that political ties are subject to, while the strategic benefits of specific destinations of ties 
depend on the degree of diffusion of power among political actors. This section predicts that 
these factors will lead to variation in the diversification benefits of particular types and 
destinations of political ties in different political economic contexts.   
The predictions compare contexts in which both political and economic systems are 
closed (e.g., Taiwan under Chiang Kaishek’s KMT through the mid-1980s, and the 
Communist Party in the Soviet Union of the 1970s) to contexts that have undergone 
substantial transition to active multi-party states with more open economies (e.g., Korea and 
Taiwan today). We refer to countries with closed political systems and economies as closed 
political economic systems, and countries with active multi-party states and more open 
economies as open political economic systems. We will discuss the implications of off-
diagonal cases (open polities with closed economies, or closed polities with open economies) 
later in the paper.  10
Diversification Benefits of Formal Position Interlocks in Closed Political Economies 
We first argue that diversification benefits in closed political economic systems 
primarily arise from formal position interlocks with party leaders and senior government 
officials, who directly influence resource allocation. The prediction stems from concentrated 
power among political actors, limited tie accountability of political actors, and limited public 
scrutiny of political ties.  
Diffusion of power influences which tie destinations offer strategic benefits. Control 
over resource allocation is relatively concentrated in closed political economic systems. In 
closed polities and closed economies, leaders of the dominant party and senior government 
officials typically have primary control over laws, regulations, investment decisions, and 
other key resources that would support business diversification and other strategy (Johnson 
and Mitton, 2003). By contrast, legislators tend to be weak in authoritarian regimes and 
closed economies. In closed polities, legislators commonly serve at the discretion of the 
ruling party, while legislators in closed economies typically have only limited influence on 
the major decisions that influence regulated industries. 
Thus, concentrated power in closed political economic contexts means that the 
primary strategic benefits of political ties stem from the ruling political party and senior 
government officials, who have direct influence on resource allocation. Relevant examples 
include Golkar in Indonesia, the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, and the KMT in pre-
liberalization Taiwan.  
In turn, the degree of tie accountability and public scrutiny influences which types of 
ties offer greatest strategic benefits. We begin by considering tie accountability. 
In closed political economic contexts, political actors face only limited accountability 
to follow through on their promises to business actors who seek favors. In closed polities, 
business leaders who do not receive promised resources have few remedies: they cannot 
switch political alliances, nor can they rely on the courts to enforce agreements (even if they  11
were willing to make the agreement public) because dominant political actors typically 
control or co-opt the legal system (O'Donnell, 1999). In closed economies, meanwhile, 
political actors face limited tie accountability in their promises to allocate business resources 
because their tight control of the economic environment means that business leaders have few 
immediate economic alternatives if the political actors renege. In India in the 1960s, for 
instance, business leaders in regulated industries had few options for reinvestment or 
alternative strategies if senior government officials or current party leaders changed their 
policies. Because of the limited tie accountability in closed political economic contexts, 
businesses that seek strategic resources from political sources will find greater reliability 
from formal position interlocks than from informal social ties. 
Now consider the role of public scrutiny. Active public scrutiny helps hold politicians 
accountable to the broader civil society, rather than to their ties with individual business 
leaders or other partners (Smulovitz and Pruzzotti, 2006). Civil society often views business-
government ties as illegitimate or illegal, so that the public scrutiny of highly visible position 
interlocks will be politically damaging (Besley and Burgess, 2001). Limits on public scrutiny 
in closed political economic contexts, therefore, will reduce the political costs that can arise 
from publicity about formal position interlocks and will reinforce the value of formal position 
interlocks.  
Public scrutiny in closed political economic contexts faces several constraints. The 
lack of active public media in closed polities means that there is little public discussion of 
even seemingly-obvious position interlocks between business leaders and political actors. A 
lack of free press may mean that the general public is not even aware of the ties that exist 
between government officials and business leaders. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes often 
have comprehensive control and/or surveillance of social organizations and interest groups in 
civil society. This inhibits the development of shareholder activism, which demands 
information disclosure and transparency in firm governance but can take place only with the  12
presence of autonomous and independent social organizations, such as the People's Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) in Korea (Rho, 2006). Closed economies, meanwhile, 
may have a public press, but commonly lack other forms of public scrutiny such as active 
market analysts and financial press (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). In closed political economic 
contexts, therefore, formal position interlocks both offer the benefits of greater tie 
accountability and incur only limited costs of public scrutiny. 
The combination of concentrated power, limited tie accountability, and limited public 
scrutiny in closed political economic contexts provides the logic for the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1. The more closed a country's political economic system, the greater the 
diversification benefits that a firm gains from formal position interlocks with the 
ruling political party and government officials relative to either formal position 
interlocks with legislators or informal social ties with any type of political actor. 
Reduced Benefits of Formal Position Interlocks in Open Political Economies 
We next argue that the diversification benefits of formal position interlocks with the 
ruling party and government officials will decline as a political economic system becomes 
more open. The change occurs because increases in public scrutiny will reduce the strategic 
benefits of formal position interlocks. Public scrutiny in open polities increases due to retreat 
of political control of mass media (Almond and Powell, 2004), while scrutiny increases in 
open economies due to increased presence of financial press, market analysts, rating agencies, 
accounting firms, and shareholder activitism groups that facilitate information disclosure 
about corporate governance (Khanna and Palepu, 2000a).  
In a liberalized society, public media highlight business-government connections to a 
much greater extent than in closed polities. In Taiwan, for instance, there were few newspaper 
reports or studies about political ties before 1986, when Taiwan was under the control of 
Chiang Kaishek and his son Chiang Ching-Kuo. After democratization, by contrast, reports 
and studies flourished. Headlines such “Business Ties of the Parliament Members” and “The 
Family and Relatives of the President” appeared in major mass media (Business Weekly,  13
December 1992: 24-52; Chen, 1999).  
Public scrutiny will often deter power holders and business leaders from leveraging 
position interlocks that would provide easy targets for criticism (Besley and Burgess, 2001). 
As Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006: 416) point out, “High levels of transparency and public 
attention may be difficult to reconcile with political favors of often dubious legality.” Even 
when interlocks exist, actors will tend to limit the advantage they take from these ties due to 
the costs of illegitimacy and public sanction. The existence of a more independent legal 
system increases the possibility of paying a high price for attempting to leverage position 
interlocks. Fisman, Fisman, Galef, and Khurana (2006), for instance, find no evidence that 
businesses connected to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney have benefited from their ties, and 
speculate that the lack of benefits stems from the visibility of the ties. Thus, the strategic 
benefits of formal position interlocks will decline in open political economic contexts. 
Hypothesis 2. The diversification benefits that a firm gains from formal position 
interlocks with the ruling political party and government officials will decline as a 
country's political economic system becomes more open.  
While we expect the diversification benefits of formal position interlocks to decline as 
the institutional context becomes more open, we leave the issue of whether any benefit 
remains as an empirical question. Formal ties might still offer some value, especially in an 
emerging market context that retains limits to transparency.  
Increased Benefits of Informal Social Ties in Open Political Economies 
Finally, we argue that the diversification benefits of informal social ties with multiple 
political actors will increase as a country's political economic system becomes more open. 
Greater tie accountability and increased diffusion of power among political actors drive this 
change.  
Politicians in open polities and economies incur greater tie accountability for their 
commitments to business actors because business actors have more options to support rival 
politicians (Morck and Yeung, 2004). General elections, competition for contributions, and  14
competition among different locations for business activities make politicians more 
accountable to the interests of the business with whom they have ties. The more balanced 
power relationship between state and business reduces the agency costs embedded in 
informal social relationships, which in turn increases the strategic benefits of informal social 
ties in open political economic contexts. 
Increased public scrutiny of political ties plays an indirect role here, because the 
greater tie accountability allows the actors to take advantage of the lower public scrutiny that 
informal social ties face. Because it is more difficult and costly to trace and locate hard 
evidence for social ties than position interlocks, increased prevalence of public scrutiny in 
open political economic systems increases the relative value of informal social ties. 
Finally, political power tends to diffuse more broadly in open political economic 
contexts, which increases the range of political actors who can confer strategic benefits. 
Huntington (1991) notes that the locus of political power often moves from a dominant 
political party in a closed system to a more heterogeneous set of national and local political 
bodies in a pluralistic system. Diffusion of power also occurs when an economy becomes 
more open, because economic deregulation opens previously-monopolized industries and 
different kinds of firms carve out different niches in the newly-emerged industries (Carroll 
and Hannan, 2000). In turn, new laws and regulations that govern economic transactions 
emerge, creating new power for the wide range of legislators and other political actors who 
are responsible for initiating rules. Thus, although party officials and senior administrators 
may still be influential, they are no longer the sole power source in an open economy. In 
China today, for instance, national and local legislators have substantial impact on 
investments and laws that support corporate expansion in the country.  
This shift of power in more open polities and economies means that political ties with 
a greater range of political actors offer strategic benefits. Although which specific actors will 
carry the most power will vary depending on the context, the core point is that, in a pluralistic  15
political economic context, a wider range of destinations will offer strategic benefits than in 
more closed state.  
Hence, the value of informal social ties will increase in open political economic 
contexts because of the greater ability to hold political actors accountable, while the range of 
actors who can allocate strategic benefits will increase.  
Hypothesis 3. The diversification benefits that a firm gains from informal social ties 
with multiple political actors will increase as a country's political economic system 
becomes more open. 
The predictions reflect the argument that political openness and economic openness 
will reinforce each other, so that the change in the diversification benefits of formal position 
interlocks and informal social ties will be particularly marked in countries that are either open 
or closed on both dimensions. Nonetheless, the logic of the argument suggests that the effects 
of increased openness will be at least moderately influential in a country that becomes more 
open economically while remaining politically closed (e.g., China in the 2000s) or a country 
that becomes more open politically while remaining economically closed (e.g., India before 
the 1990s). The locus of power might differ in the off-diagonal cases, however, with the 
ruling political party having greatest power in the closed polity-open economy case (e.g., 
China) and senior bureaucrats having the greatest power in the open polity-closed economy 
case (e.g., India in the 1960s or Japan until recently).  
We will test the hypotheses in a context in which a country has undertaken substantial 
though still incomplete transition to an open political economic context (Taiwan in the 1990s). 
We believe that the logic of hypotheses 2 and 3 is also valid in countries with even more 
widely open political economic systems, such as the U.S. or Western European countries. An 
empirical question for our analysis concerns whether informal social ties provided greater 
absolute benefit than formal position interlocks in Taiwan's stage of political economic 
openness in the 1990s.   16
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION AND POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN TAIWAN 
Using Taiwanese business groups and their political ties and diversification in the 
1980s and 1990s as our research setting has three strengths. First, Taiwanese business groups 
have undertaken extensive diversification, triggered by the economic growth of the country 
since the 1970s (Chung and Mahmood, 2006). Second, ties between Taiwanese business 
groups and the Nationalist Party regime (KMT) are common (Fields, 1995). Kang (2002) 
suggests that Taiwan is an example of crony capitalism, featuring vote buying and outspread 
clientism, which may arise from the fact that the social-political structure in Taiwan is 
characterized by low trust (Fukuyama, 1995) and hence networking activities occur in both 
political and business arenas (Peng, 2003). Incomplete market transparency also contributes 
to the abundance of ties, as there are no regulations about ownership and directorship of 
private enterprises by political party leaders or parliament members (Faccio, 2006: Table III). 
Third, Taiwan experienced large-scale political democratization and economic liberalizations 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which scholars labeled the Great Transition (Tien, 
1989). The frequency of ties together with the large-scale transition makes Taiwan an ideal 
setting in which to study how institutional contexts shape the strategic benefits of political 
ties.  
The KMT Nationalist Party dominated Taiwan’s politics and economy from its retreat 
from Mainland China in 1949 until 1987 (Gold, 1985; Wade, 1990). Before the transition, 
Taiwan’s government was authoritarian, sometimes described as quasi-Leninist (Cheng, 
1989). Indeed, for almost 40 years, Taiwan was under martial law, with only the KMT 
permitted to participate as a political party. Parliament members were selected by the KMT, 
rather than being elected by local voters; the KMT also appointed government and military 
officials. State agencies functioned as executive arms of the KMT, while the parliament 
served as a low-powered agency that lent the state agencies legitimacy. During this 
authoritarian period, the relationship between business groups and the political regime was  17
mainly top-down and co-optive. In order to gain support from large business groups, the 
KMT regime strategically allocated well-linked groups with entry permits to oligopolistic or 
monopolistic industries. Business groups had little leverage to play against the KMT and 
needed to cultivate and maintain good relationships with the regime (Chung, 2006).  
The year 1987 marked the beginning of the evolution of Taiwan’s political and 
economic institutions. Martial law was lifted in 1987, and new political parties, labor protests, 
and private mass media were allowed. The death of President Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1988 
reduced the cohesion of the central leadership of KMT and expedited the pace of 
democratization. The establishment of the major opposition party, the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), intensified the competition in political elections. On the economic 
side, deregulations of the legal framework also occurred within a short period (Pistor and 
Wellons, 1998). Cheng and Chu (2002) estimate that the Taiwanese state introduced more 
deregulatory measures in the five years between 1988 and 1993 than in the previous two 
decades. The changes led to deregulation of many monopolized industries and privatization 
of state enterprises. Large-scale reductions of import control and tariffs also occurred, as well 
as liberalization for foreign investment, bank interest rates, and exchange rates. Table 1 lists 
the indicators of political and economic changes before and after the transition. 
********** Table 1 about here ********** 
Taiwan also underwent substantial changes in market monitoring during the 1990s. 
Before 1990, no foreign equity analysts followed Taiwanese companies. The number then 
grew to 46 in 1994 and 138 in 1998 (Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research). In addition, 
independent credit rating agencies became established during the late 1990s 
(http://www.taiwanratings.com/tw/). 
Even though the KMT remained the largest political party until the 2000s, the party 
faced strong challenges from the DPP after democratization took hold during the 1990s. In 
response, the KMT sought suggestions, donations, and votes from business groups to help  18
retain its position. In the process, the relationship between business groups and KMT turned 
from top-down co-optation to a more balanced partnership. The opening up of parliamentary 
elections also contributed to business groups’ leverage. Large conglomerates could now send 
delegates into parliament to defend their interests and no longer relied as directly on KMT. 
This change became especially strong after 1993, the first year when all members of 
parliament were directly elected. Due to the pressures from their supporters, legislators could 
now sometimes act independently of party discipline and exert strong pressures on 
government officials. Also due to the pressure from the DPP, government agencies became 
decoupled from the operations of the KMT and could act with greater neutrality. Figure 1 
depicts the changes of power relationships among the major political players and between the 
players and business groups before and after the 1987-1988 transition. 
********** Figure 1 about here ********** 
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
Political connections 
We discuss three issues that arise in identifying political connections. First, 
determining a valid and reliable measure of a firm’s political connection is a challenging task. 
Some studies adopt indirect approaches by using subject rating, indexes, and reports collected 
by other agencies. For example, Fisman (2001) employed the Suharto Dependency Index 
developed by a consulting firm in Jakarta. This index draws on subjective assessments of top 
consultants and ranges from one (least dependent) to five (most dependent). Other studies 
search for associations of backgrounds between major stakeholders of the firm and key 
political figures (see Useem, 1984; Siegel, 2007). For example, Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, 
and Thesmar (2004) trace educational background and working experience of French CEOs 
and suggest that CEOs who went through specific elite schools and had working experience 
in the civil service will have social, political, and ideological connections with political elites. 
Interpersonal ties are fluid, however, and often extend across different associations or  19
geographical boundaries. As a result, the indirect and background approaches may miss many 
ties.  
This paper adopts a more direct approach that locates specific ties between business 
executives and politicians. Our approach is similar to Faccio (2006), who used publicly-
available sources to identify political connections and found that large shareholders and top 
officials have substantial relationships with parliament members and governmental ministers 
in many countries. We were able to obtain access to a wider set of sources than Faccio’s study. 
The second issue is that almost all existing studies have adopted synchronized 
research designs, examining only political connections and firm strategy within the same time 
period. This approach does not allow one to examine potential endogeneity and reverse 
causality in diversification and political ties. Instead, one needs to collect longitudinal data. 
We collected ties and diversification data for three time periods (1986, 1990, and 1994), plus 
additional diversification data for 1998, so that they study extends across pre-transition and 
post-transition contexts in Taiwan. The major data source is a series of trade directories called 
Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT), as the appendix describes in more depth. Although the 
BGT directory is published every two years, we used a four-year lag between measuring ties 
both for coding efficiency and to allow sufficient time for us to observe changes in 
connections. 
Third, most studies use single firms as the unit of analysis, while noting the fact that 
many firms in emerging economies are group members that follow group-influenced 
strategies. While some studies include a dummy variable to control for group effects (Fisman, 
2001; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), no large-scale empirical test uses the group as the 
research unit, largely because group-level information is difficult to identify and collect 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Using a database with key stakeholders of every member firm in 
the group (including private and public group affiliates), we are able to code group-level 
political connections and analyze their effects on group diversification.   20
We collected information of formal position interlocks and informal social ties 
between business groups and the political regime. For the business group sample, we 
included the largest 100 groups based on sales. Due to slight variation in data collection in 
different years in our data source, we have information for 97 groups in 1986, 101 groups in 
1990, 115 groups in 1994, and 100 groups in 1998. The combined sales of these groups 
constitute 30 to 40 percent of national GDP in these periods (Chung and Mahmood, 2006).  
For formal position interlocks, we have data on key position holders in business 
groups and the political circle (the Appendix provides details of data sources and coding). We 
then cross-checked the names of business groups with the names in the major political 
institutions to identify position interlocks. Social ties are family, friendship, and regional 
relationships between group executives and political figures. By examining social structure 
and the principles of how political ties operate in Taiwan (Hsu, 1991), we identified and 
coded three major types of social ties: (1) family-intermarriage ties, (2) close friend/same-
hometown ties, and (3) trade associations/social clubs membership. 
Measures: Connections, Diversification, and Control Variables 
We use the number of ties between a group and the political regime in 1986, 1990, 
and 1994 as our measure of political connections. We distinguished between formal and 
informal connections. 
We used the number of 2-digit SIC (SIC 2) codes as our primary measure for group 
diversification. SIC 2 is primarily a measure of unrelated diversification. We found similar 
results in sensitivity analysis when we used an entropy measure of total diversification 
(Palepu, 1985). There was little related diversification during the period, based on an entropy 
measure of related diversification (Chung and Mahmood, 2006), so that it was not useful to 
distinguish between related and unrelated diversification. Indeed, Amsden and Hikino (1994) 
argue that unrelated diversification is the primary form of diversification in an emerging 
economy, because firms lack the proprietary technology needed to diversify around a core  21
technology. Following Khanna and Palepu (2000b), we constructed group level 
diversification according to the product information of each member firm. We measured 
diversification in 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998. 
Unlike most U.S. data, there is no ready-to-use industry coding in the BGT directory 
(see Appendix). The directory did not provide a digital format until 2000. Therefore, we 
examined the paper directory and manually assigned an industry code to each of the member 
firms. We employed the Standard Industrial Classification codes published by Taiwanese 
government in 1996, which include 66 industries at the 2-digit level and 667 industries at the 
4-digit level. We then calculated group level entropy by aggregating firm sales at the 2-digit 
and 4-digit levels. 
Following previous studies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b), we controlled for a set of 
group characteristics that may also affect the diversification activities of the group: Group age, 
group size, group profitability, group liability, and group main industry. We used the year 
when the first member firm was established as the birth of the business group. We measured 
size by logged total assets, adjusted by the 1996 consumer price index (Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book, 2000: 179). We measured profitability as return-on assets and liability as the ratio 
of debt to net worth. We also controlled for the main industry of the group across 13 
industries: Agriculture, food, textile, wood, chemical, non-metallic, metals, machinery, 
electrical/electronic, construction, retailing, real estate and financial services, and other 
services. The industry with the largest proportion of group sales was coded as the major 
business line. On average, the major business line contributed 56 % of group sales. We coded 
the group characteristics from the BGT directories in relevant years. 
Unobservable group-specific factors might correlate with a group’s diversification 
activities and political ties. The lack of a set of proprietary technologies might lead to greater 
incentives for groups to forge more ties with political authorities, for instance, which may 
also create incentive for groups to diversify in order to reduce group-specific risk (Amsden  22
and Hikino, 1994). Family stakes in ownership may also increase diversification in order to 
reduce concentration of family assets in one industry. At the same time, family ownership 
may also drive the group to build and maintain ties to political power to ensure the longevity 
of family fortune (Morck and Yeung, 2004). We addressed such unobserved heterogeneity by 
using sector dummies (five sectors that aggregated related industries; see notes in Table 1a) 
and creating fixed-effects dummy variables for each business group.  
Model specification 
We used the following baseline specification to test the relation between group 
diversification and political connections: 
Change of Diversificationt
t+1 = β + β1 (a vector of political connection variables)t +  
β2 (a vector of group characteristic variables) t + β3 (sector dummies) + β4 (group 
dummies) + β5 (year dummies) + ε 
We measured change of diversification as the difference of diversification of the same 
group between the current year and four years later. For example, we use the independent 
variables in 1994 to estimate the change of diversification between 1994 and 1998. Four 
years provides sufficient time in which to observe changes, while matching the four-year 
difference in our measures of political ties.  
Table 2 reports summary statistics and correlations. The table shows that social ties 
are more numerous than position interlocks (mean = 4.87 versus 0.59), while social ties to the 
KMT and administrators accounted were most common. 
1 
********** Table 2 about here ********** 
A0NALYSIS 
Descriptive Statistics 
We first distinguish politically-connected groups from unconnected groups, and 
compare their organizational features and industrial distribution. Starting from formal 
position interlocks, Table 3 shows that about 30% of the groups had interlock connections. 
The ratio is significantly higher than the 0.84% (out of 237 listed Taiwanese companies)  23
reported by Faccio (2006), likely due to different units of analysis (business groups vs. listed 
firms) and comprehensiveness of our data sources. Formally connected groups are older and 
larger than unconnected groups, consistent with previous studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006). Formally connected groups also have only 
slightly superior financial profile (i.e., return-on-assets and liability/assets) which is in line 
with the inconclusive evidence presented in existing studies regarding political ties and firm 
financial returns (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar, 2004).  
********** Tables 3 about here ********** 
In terms of industrial participation, formally connected groups tend to be less 
common in traditional sectors, such as the food, textile, wood, chemical, and non-metallic 
industries (Sector 1). This sector was the first set of industries that took off in Taiwan’s 
industrialization during the 1960s. By contrast, formally connected groups are heavily-
represented in the financial sector (Sector 3), in which government license and contracts, 
bank loans, and market information are essential. Most importantly, both the measures of 
number of 2-digit SIC codes and total entropy show that formally connected groups are 
significantly more diversified than non-connected groups. Formally connected groups on 
average participated in about three more 2-digit industries than non-connected groups.  
The results for informal political ties in Table 3 are similar to the patterns of formal 
position interlock. Socially connected groups tend to be older, larger, and more diversified. 
This consistency is notable given that 75 percent of the groups are socially-linked to the 
political regime, as compared to the 30 percent of groups that have formal position interlocks. 
Contingencies of Ties: Effects of Different Types and Destinations in Different Contexts  
Table 4a reports the effects of political ties on 2-digit SIC diversification by reporting 
how the effects of position interlocks and social ties vary across (1) the number of ties to the 
KMT, (2) the number of ties to government officials, and (3) the number of ties to legislators. 
(The entropy measure of diversification produced similar results).  24
********** Table 4a about here ********** 
We use OLS with robust standard errors to guard against potential heteroscedasticity. 
In light of the correlations among different destinations of social ties, we estimate the 
contingency of ties by including both interlock and social ties to a specific destination 
(example, ties to the KMT) in the same model, while specifying different models for different 
destinations. The analysis pools the data for 1986, 1990, and 1994 to increase the degrees of 
freedom and to enable us to use dummies to control for group-specific fixed effects.  
Table 4a reports initial estimates of how political ties influence per-period growth in 
diversification. Columns 1a and 1b in Table 4 report the results for KMT ties; column 1a 
provides the baseline model, while column 1b reports the interaction effects between KMT 
ties and period dummies. Similarly, columns 2a and 2b report the results for the ties to 
officials, while columns 3a and 3b report the results for the legislator ties.  
Four initial results stand out in Table 4a. First, formal position interlocks with the 
KMT contributed to diversification, with greatest impact during the pre-liberalization period 
(column 1b). Moreover, position interlocks with the KMT have a moderately significant 
positive main effect, as well as their interaction with the pre-liberalization dummy, which 
suggests that the KMT continued to function as a dispenser of resources even during the post-
liberalization period, although the impact was greatest before liberalization. Second, position 
interlocks with government officials also provided at least moderate benefits during the pre-
liberalization period (column 2b). Third, position interlocks with legislators provided benefits 
throughout the study period (column 3b), which suggests that business leaders who 
functioned directly as legislators were able to dispense at least a moderate degree of resources 
for their groups. Fourth, informal social ties with all three destinations provide greatest 
benefits after liberalization (columns 1b, 2b, and 3b).  
Table 4b then reports statistical comparisons of coefficients from Table 4a to test the 
hypotheses. The results strongly support Hypothesis 1, based on difference-between-means t- 25
tests across the fully specified models in columns 1b, 2b, and 3b of Table 4a (Miner, 
Amburgey, and Stearns, 1990; xxWonnacott and Wonnacott, 1977: 214). The t-tests compare 
the net effect of pre-liberalization formal political ties with the KMT (i.e., the coefficient for 
the baseline effect of position interlocks plus the coefficient for the incremental effect of the 
pre-liberalization period: cell A1 of Table 4b) and officials (cell A2) to the net effect of pre-
liberalization position interlocks with legislators (cell A3), as well as the net effect of pre-
liberalization informal social ties with each of the three destinations (cells B1, B2, and B3). 
All eight comparisons are highly significant (A1 v. A3 through A2 v. B3, p<0.01). Thus, as 
expected, during the pre-liberalization period, position interlocks with the KMT or with 
senior officials had far greater impact on diversification than other ties. 
********** Table 4b about here ********** 
The results in Table 4b also support Hypothesis 2, concerning the declining benefits 
of formal position interlocks with the KMT and senior officials as a political economic 
context becomes more open, although with mixed statistical significance. These tests use F-
statistics that compare the fit of a model that constrains the values of each pair of coefficients 
to be equal to the fit of a model that allows the coefficients to vary. For both the KMT and 
officials, the coefficient values decline substantially from pre-liberalization to post-
liberalization periods, as expected (rows C and D of Table 4b), but only the KMT comparison 
is statistically significant at conventional levels (C1 v. D1, p<0.01). The statistical test for the 
decline in the value of formal position interlocks with officials is substantially less significant 
(C2 v. D2, p<0.16), owing to the substantial standard error on the pre-liberalization 
coefficient (see Table 4a).
2  
Finally, Table 4b offers strong support for Hypothesis 3, concerning the increasing 
value of informal social ties with all destinations as the political economic context becomes 
more open. These tests also use F-statistics. In each of the three destinations, informal social 
ties generate greater benefits during the post-liberalization period than during the pre- 26
liberalization period (E1 v. F1, p<0.05; E2 v. F2 & E3 v. F3, p< 0.01). Thus, as expected, 
informal social ties confer increasing strategic benefits as the institutional context becomes 
more open. 
Several control variables in Table 4a warrant comment. First, the post-liberalization 
dummy for 1994 has a positive impact on diversification in the three baseline models, 
suggesting that many groups were able to take advantage of expansion opportunities once the 
economy and polity became more open. Nonetheless, the effect becomes insignificant in 
columns 1b and 2b, suggesting that the post-liberalization effect primarily arises for groups 
with extensive informal social ties (because informal social ties had the strongest effect on 
post-liberalization diversification in the fully-specified models). Moreover, the test of 
hypothesis 2 demonstrates that political connections have substantial value in the more open 
era, rather than being made irrelevant by the liberalization. Second, group age and size have 
no influence beyond those that are controlled by group-specific fixed effects. Third, group 
profitability (ROA) is moderately positive, with significance in most models. Fourth, highly 
diversified groups undertake less subsequent diversification.  
Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Checks  
Sensitivity analysis examined two other controls. First, as a control for a groups’ 
access to proprietary technology, which may serve as a substitute for the resources that 
political ties provide, we examined the number of Taiwanese patents a group owned. Second, 
we added a variable for insider ownership, which might affect both political tie building and 
diversification (Morck and Yeung, 2004), measured by the share of group ownership held by 
the controlling family as well as group affiliates that the family directly or indirectly 
controlled. Both variables were insignificant. 
The evidence so far shows strong association between political connections and group 
diversification.  However, there arises a question concerning the possibility of reverse 
causality and, more generally, unobserved heterogeneity, because it is also possible that  27
diversification leads to establishment of political ties. For example, the need for resources 
such as capital, information, talent, technology, and government privileges when firms 
expand into new industrial sectors could drive the firms to build political connections 
(Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004). Moreover, politicians may perceive diversified business 
groups as more desirable parties with which to build relationships. Morck and Yeung (2004) 
suggest that ties between corporate and political elites can be viewed as games. Multiple 
simultaneous games induce trust between the two parties and make cooperative outcomes 
more likely and stable. The more diversified a business group, the more likely the group will 
interact with politicians in different settings simultaneously; if either of the parties breaks 
faith in one setting, the betrayed party may punish it in other settings. Previous studies 
address the causality issue by arguing that most ties are pre-determined because they relate to 
family and kinship, with long history (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Other studies have used 
instrumental variables to address this concern (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). In our study, 
the availability of panel data allows us to use fixed effects models to address such issues of 
unobserved heterogeneity, as we described earlier.  
Nonetheless, the basic fixed-effects approach is a single-equation analysis. When the 
variable of interest is endogenous, as it might be in the case of political ties, a second 
equation needs to specify the determinants of a group's propensity to form political ties. 
Therefore, we used two standard econometric approaches for estimating systems of equations, 
the instrumental variable approach and the Heckman’s two-step sample selection model (see 
appendices 2a and 2b). The results were similar to Table 4a, although sometimes with slightly 
lower statistical significance in the instrumental variables approach owing to reduced degrees 
of freedom in the fixed effects analysis.  
We also plotted diversification and the number of ties over time, to ensure that the 
apparent relationship between informal social ties and increased diversification during the 
liberalization period did not arise from common time trends (in spite of the controls for time  28
that we included in the regressions). The mean number of informal social ties per group was 
similar in 1986, 1990, and 1994, even as diversification increased, demonstrating that the 
statistical results do not reflect a spurious relationship between informal social ties and 
increased diversification over time.  
Finally, we assessed possible correlations among repeated observations, in two ways. 
First, we clustered years within groups. Second, because groups operating in the same 
industry face similar policy exposures and external changes, we clustered groups within 
industries. In both cases, the results were materially equivalent to those in Table 4a.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Our research is motivated by the need to examine how different types and destinations 
of political ties influence business strategy in varied political economic contexts. The 
argument focuses on the role of public scrutiny, tie accountability, and diffusion of power in 
shaping strategy, with particular focus on diversification benefits. We demonstrate that formal 
position interlocks to the ruling political party and senior government officials facilitate 
diversification in a closed political economic system, while informal social ties to multiple 
political actors have greater impact in a more open political economic system. The results 
advance the emerging literature on business-political ties (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 
2003; Faccio, 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2007) by incorporating 
longitudinal institutional changes into the theory as well as by examining comprehensive 
individual-level data in the analysis.  
It is useful to consider how the results might apply in even more open political 
economic contexts than that of Taiwan in the 1990s. Figure 2 provides a summary overview 
of the trends in strategic benefits of formal and informal linkages as a political economic 
context becomes more open. During the period of the study, Taiwan moved from the left side 
of the chart to a more central position, somewhere beyond the point at which informal social 
ties tended to provide greater benefits than formal position interlocks. Nonetheless, position  29
interlocks continued to provide substantial benefits in Taiwan, even in the 1990s. For the U.S., 
however, it is likely that formal position interlocks tend to offer substantially fewer benefits, 
due to even greater political economic openness. Diffusion of power, public scrutiny, and tie 
accountability resulting from greater ability to punish broken promises substantially limit the 
strategic benefits of position interlocks, consistent with Fisman, Fisman, Galef, and 
Khurana's (2006) results concerning Dick Cheney's ties with businesses. Nonetheless, 
informal social ties will have substantial value in the U.S., especially if business leaders and 
political actors substitute more inconspicuous informal social relationships for highly visible 
position interlocks.  
********** Figure 2 about here ********** 
The results have direct implications for the political economy literature. Traditionally, 
this literature highlights the importance of relationships between private businesses and the 
state (e.g., Bauer Pool, and Dexter, 1972; MacIntyre, 1994; Evans, 1995; Schneider, 1998). 
By contrast, the personal ties that connect politicians and business leaders have received only 
limited attention. The literature tends to treat political ties as a homogeneous category and 
confine the investigation within the domain of trade associations and similar peak 
organizations. Further, empirical works often rely on case studies, anecdotal evidence, and 
journalist accounts, with little large-scale, systematic data collection and analysis. By 
specifying the mechanisms of how different types and destinations of ties function, our 
research helps indicate the locations (domains) where the ties will matter in different political 
economic contexts. This is important because political economy research often addresses 
issues that involve different ties in distinct domains. In studying the creation of industrial and 
economic policies, for instance, future studies of political economy could usefully examine 
social ties between parliament members and large businesses, as well as memberships in 
trade associations. 
The study also has implications for the social networks, diversification strategy, and  30
business groups literatures, the bodies of work on which we drew in order to reinforce the 
political economic literature. The social network literature highlights the importance of social 
relationships in shaping economic behavior (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). While this 
approach provides insights regarding the nature of different types and destinations of social 
relationships, the literature has understated the influence of macro contextual forces, without 
sufficiently assessing how contingencies from the institutional environment influence the 
effects of social ties. As Lie (1997: 351) points out, “the embeddedness approach must itself 
be embedded in larger, historically transient, social structures.” More recent studies have 
started to explore different institutional contingencies for different types of ties, such as inter-
firm ties in the IPO process, social ties among business group affiliates, and director 
interlocks (Gulati and Higgens, 2003; Luo and Chung, 2005; Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis, 
2006). Our study helps fill this gap by specifying how contingencies of political and 
economic systems shape the ways political ties facilitate business strategy. Moreover, while 
political and economic contexts are particularly relevant to political ties, they also apply to 
other kinds of ties, such as strategic alliances and interlocking directorates between private 
businesses. The mechanisms of tie accountability, pubic scrutiny, and diffusion of power may 
moderate the choice of alliance partners as well as the performance effects of the alliance and 
director ties.  
The study advances diversification strategy studies by adding a political component 
that the literature often omits (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994: 135). Traditional diversification 
strategy studies focus on how internal resources drive firms to move into new product 
markets (Hoskission and Hitt, 1990). Resource-based theory (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 
1984) views firm-specific tangible and intangible internal resources as the heart of a firm’s 
decision to diversify. Beyond internal resources, however, elements of firms’ external 
environments, such as governmental policies and political connections, can also influence 
diversification strategy, as we show. In this respect, our argument is consistent with the  31
emerging institutional perspective in strategic management (Dobbin and Baum, 2000; Ingram 
and Silverman, 2002), which contends that the choice of business strategy is not simply 
driven by firms' inherent resources, but is also shaped by prevailing institutional contexts. 
Future studies may clarify the role of external linkages in shaping a firm’s behavior by 
examining the interaction effects between internal resources and political ties. 
Finally, our results also have implications for the business group literature. Studies of 
business groups have focused on the unique organizational form of the group and the 
relationships between the group form and group diversification and performance. Khanna and 
Palepu (1999, 2000a) suggest that business groups exist because the group form enables each 
group to perform the function of internal capital market and overcome institutional 
insufficiency in emerging economies. The more diversified a group is, the better the 
replacement function of internal markets, and hence the better the group performs (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000b). While this line of reasoning has borne empirical results, other aspects 
that may also shape how business groups operate and perform have been overlooked. Our 
research highlights the importance of examining the interface between business groups and 
external institutional sectors such as political bodies in explaining group behavior 
(Granovetter, 2005), and helps to create a more comprehensive theory of business groups in 
emerging markets. Future studies of business groups may want to examine how political ties 
of a group affect group performance such as financial returns and innovation outputs (e.g., 
Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004). 
Several limitations of the study point to avenues for future research. One limitation 
concerns identifying informal social ties. Although formal position interlocks between the 
business community and the political circle are relatively easy to identify, identifying social 
ties is more complicated. Studies of social ties that rely on published data, such as ours, suffer 
potential problems from selection bias. Reported relationships commonly highlight prominent 
businessmen and politicians, which may understate the impact of less prominent ties and  32
hence bias the estimated coefficients downward. Nonetheless, we found significant results, 
even for a possibly underestimated measure.  
Second, it would be useful to consider non-linearities in the relationships. For instance, 
extreme cases of political ties might constrain diversification rather than facilitate it. In 
exploratory analysis, we found no systematic non-linear influences, but such effects merit 
further study. Third, we focus on one key aspect of business strategy, diversification. This is a 
critically important element of strategy, but other elements of strategy and performance merit 
consideration. Fourth, future studies can move a step further to examine whether the nature of 
ties moderates the effects on business strategy. This would be particularly useful for 
analyzing the effects of social ties. Firms can be connected to politicians informally through 
family or marriage, through friendship or former classmates, and though trade associations or 
club memberships. These different ties may well bear different strengths and hence have 
different effects on firm strategy.  
In conclusion, the relationship between political ties and business strategy is an 
important and yet understudied topic in political economy, as well as in strategy management 
and organizational theory. Our study demonstrates that different types and destinations of ties 
carry significant consequences for firm strategy, highlighting the institutionally contingent 
nature of the influences. We hope this study will encourage research that examines the effects 
of ties across multiple countries and time periods and further clarifies the institutional 
contingencies of political ties. 
ENDNOTES
                                                 
1 Table 2 reports low correlations of profitability (return on assets) with the various measures of political ties (r= 
-0.11 to 0.09) and diversification (r= -0.05). We are interested in ties and diversification because of the overall 
impact of diversification on economic development, rather than because of individual firm profitability. 
2 The high standard error likely arises because formal ties between business leaders and government officials are 
the least common tie (Table 3).  33
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Table 1. Indicators of political and economic changes before and after the institutional transition  




Political Democratization    
Number of TV and cable channels (Cheng, 2002)  3  115 
Number of newspapers (Lin, 1999)  2  17 
Average number of registered social organizations   616  1967 
Average number of registered political parties  0  77 
Average number of labor protests  52  296 
Average number of national-scale general elections  0  4 
    
    
Economic Deregulation    
Number of industries deregulated
 (Chu and Hung, 2002)  0  42 
Number of public-enterprises privatized
 (Chang, 2001)  0  21 
Average tariff burden  7.6%  4.8% 
Average amount of foreign direct investment  704778  2658225 
Average exchange rate of 1 $US  37.3  27.2 
Economic freedom Index  5.2  6.5 
 
Note: The numbers of social organizations, political parties, and general elections are quoted and calculated from the website of the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs (http://www.moi.gov.tw/stat/). The unit of bank loan and foreign investment is in millions of Taiwanese dollars and is adjusted by 
consumer price index based in 1996 (quoted from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2000). The values of tariff burden before transition is the 
average of 1980-1987 (Chen, 2001). The value of economic freedom index for the pre-transition period is the average of the index in 1975, 1980 
and 1985 and the value for the post-transition period is the average of 1990 and 1995 (The Fraser Institute, 1997). The number of labor protests 
in the pre-transition period is the average of protests between 1983 and 1988 (Chu, 1992).  
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Table 2. Summary statistics and correlation matrix (n=313) 
  Variable  Mean  S.d.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
1 Formal  position  interlocks  0.59  1.16  1.00             
2 Informal  social  ties  4.87  7.45  0.43  1.00            
3  Formal position interlocks to the KMT  0.35  0.77  0.87  0.41  1.00           
4  Formal position interlocks to legislators  0.17  0.49  0.64  0.23  0.24  1.00          
5  Formal position interlocks to administrators  0.07  0.28  0.60  0.22  0.41  0.19  1.00         
6  Informal social ties to the KMT  1.89  2.90 0.38 0.91 0.38 0.21 0.15 1.00             
7  Informal social ties to legislators  0.36  0.81 0.36 0.77 0.34 0.21 0.19  0.65  1.00       
8 Informal  social  ties to administrators  2.62  4.38 0.41 0.96 0.39 0.22 0.23 0.76 0.70 1.00         
9  Diversification (Number of 2-digit SIC)  5.30  3.30 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.19 0.22 0.45 0.29 0.39 1.00       
10 Return  on  Assets  6.00 5.84 0.07 -0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 1.00     
11 Liability  1.96  4.45  -0.01  0.10  -0.01  0.02 -0.03 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.18 1.00   
12 Group  Age  29.59 10.41  0.18  0.14  0.24  -0.02 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.37 0.00 -0.01  1.00 
13  Group Size (logged assets)  9.20  1.40 0.42 0.56 0.42 0.22 0.17 0.53 0.43 0.53 0.62 0.02 0.06 0.30 
   39
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of political connections for Taiwanese business groups, 1986-1994 
 
  Formal Position Interlocks  Informal Political Ties 












1. Number of Groups  313  94  219    313  236  77   
2. Group Age  30  32  29  3**  30  30  28  2** 
3. Total Assets (Millions Taiwanese $)  29,520  54,276 18,894  35382***  29,520  37,246  5,841  31,405*** 
4. Number of Employees  3,894  6,480  2,784 3696***  3,894  4,673  1,506  3,167*** 
5. Number of Member Firms  8.5  11.96  7.07  4.89***  8.5  9.38  5.95  3.43*** 
6. Number of Listed Member Firms  0.80  1.40  0.53  0.87***  0.80  0.97  0.25  0.73*** 
7. Return on Assets  6.00  6.46  5.80 0.67  6.00 5.67 7.00  -  1.33** 
8. Liability/Assets Ratio  1.96  1.81  2.02  -0.21  1.96  2.12  1.45  0.67 
9. Number of 2-digit SIC industries   5.30  7.38  4.41  2.97*** 5.30  5.79  3.82 1.97*** 
10. Total Entropy  0.92  1.11  0.84  0.27*** 0.92  0.96  0.81 0.14*** 


































































Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Two-tailed tests for all variables. 
Sector 1 includes the food, textile, wood, chemical, and non-metallic industries; Sector 2 includes machinery and electronic/electrical industries; Sector 3 encompasses the financial industry; 
Sector 4 includes the agriculture, metals, construction, and retailing industries; Sector 5 includes  the service industry. 
Note: The industry figures in [square brackets] report the distribution of “primary industries” (the figures sum to 100% across the five sectors), while the larger figure reports the percentage of 
groups with any activity in the specified industry (hence, summing to more than 100%).   40
Table 4a. Effects of Different Types and Destinations of Political Ties on the Change in Group Diversification Using Fixed Effects OLS 


































*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 (two-tailed test); # p<0.10 (one-tailed test). Standard errors are in parentheses  













Model 3b.  
Legislators 
















































Formal position interlocks x Pre-liberalization dummy    1.059 ** 
(0.450) 








 -1.107  * 
(0.607) 






Informal social ties x Post-liberalization dummy    0.178 * 
(0.091) 
 0.167  *** 
(0.058) 
 1.051  *** 
(0.317) 








































































R-square  0.741  0.768 0.716 0.760  0.735  0.773 
Number  of  observations  246  246 246 246  246  246   41
Table 4b. Statistical Comparison of Coefficients from Table 4a to Test the Hypotheses 
Row 
Hypothesis 1: Benefits of formal position interlocks in closed 
contexts  1. KMT  2. Officials  3. Legislators    
Pair-wise 
comparisons: Formal 
KMT & officials v. 
other ties  t-test 
p-
value 
A  Pre-liberalization formal (baseline + pre-liberalization)  2.04  2.23  0.55     A1 v A3  31.28  < .01 
B  Pre-liberalization informal (baseline + pre-liberalization)  -0.26  -0.03  -0.48     A1 v. B1  69.53  < .01 
               A1 v. B2  45.93  < .01 
               A1 v. B3  56.32  < .01 
               A2 v A3  21.4  < .01 
               A2 v. B1  35.24  < .01 
               A2 v. B2  29.36  < .01 
               A2 v. B3  35.28  < .01 
                       
                       
  
Hypothesis 2: Declining benefits of formal position interlocks in 




over time  F-test 
p-
value 
C  Pre-liberalization formal (baseline + pre-liberalization)  2.04  2.23       C1 v. D1   7.76  < .01 
D  Post-liberalization formal (Baseline + post-liberalization)  0.92  -0.19       C2 v. D2   1.99  0.16 
                       
                       
  
Hypothesis 3: Increasing benefits of informal social ties in open 
contexts  1. KMT  2. Officials  3. Legislators    
Pair-wise 
comparisons: 
Informal social ties 
over time  F-test 
p-
value 
E  Pre-liberalization informal (baseline + pre-liberalization)  -0.26  -0.03  -0.48     E1 v. F1   5.66  < .05 
F  Post-liberalization informal (Baseline + post-liberalization)  0.20  0.13  1.68     E2 v. F2   12.22  < .01 
               E3 v. F3   12.75  < .01 
 
Hypothesis 1: Compares formal position interlocks with the KMT (A1) & position interlocks with officials (A2) to position interlocks with legislators (A3) & to informal social 
ties with all destinations (B1, B2, B3) in the closed political economic context (1986) 
Hypothesis 2: Compares formal position interlocks with the KMT (C1) and position interlocks with officials (C2) in the closed political economic context (1986) to position 
interlocks with the same destinations (D1 & D2) in the open political economic context (1994) 
Hypothesis 3: Compares each informal social tie (E1 & D2) in closed political economic context (1986) to the same destination of informal social tie (F1 & F2) in open political 
economic context (1994) 
 
Note: The  t-tests (H1) are based on difference-between-means tests across the fully specified models in columns 1b, 2b, and 3b of Table 4a (Miner, Amburgey, and Stearns, 1990; 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1977: 214). The within-model F-tests (H2 and H3) compare models that restrict the coefficients to be the same value to models that relax that restriction.   42
Figure 1. Relationships between business groups and the political regime before and after the institutional 
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Figure 2. Strategic Benefits of Formal Position Interlocks and Informal 
Social Ties as in Closed and Open Political Economic Contexts
Strategic
benefits
Political economic system Closed Open
High
Low
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Appendix 1: Data Sources and Coding of Political Connections 
 
For formal positions in business groups, we coded the names of the chairman of the board, CEO 
(general manager), and major shareholders of each group affiliate. These names are recorded from the 
directory of Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT), compiled by the China Credit Information Service 
(CCIS) in Taipei, which is the most prestigious credit-checking agency in Taiwan and an affiliate of 
the U.S.-based Standard & Poor’s. The directory is the most comprehensive source for business 
groups in Taiwan and has been used in previous studies (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000, Khanna 
and Rivkin 2001, Luo and Chung 2005). For group firms that are listed in the main board of Taiwan 
Stock Exchange, we coded the names of all directors and auditors, in addition to the board chair, CEO, 
and major shareholders. Since Taiwanese firms preferred to nominate family members, trusted 
persons, or associates to be directors or auditors (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005), we considered directors 
and auditors of the firm as important conduits that the dominant family used to link to the external 
environment. The names of directors and auditors are coded from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) 
database.  
 
We considered three types of political offices in Taiwan: (1) leaders of the KMT (the dominant 
political party), (2) administrators within the central and provincial governments, and (3) members of 
the national and provincial legislatures and judiciary.  
 
KMT: We coded the names of the members of KMT’s central committee (150 to 180 persons) 
and regular central committee from the proceedings of KMT’s party conventions. Because the power 
center of KMT, the regular central committee (10-15 persons), is nominated from within the central 
committee, being a member of the central committee is considered to be close to the power center and 
influential. 
 
National and provincial administrators: For the central government, we coded (1) the names of 
the ministers and vice-ministers of different ministries, and (2) the directors and deputy-directors of 
all departments one level under the ministries. We also coded the names of major officers in 
provincial governments. The information of local officials was important because they might provide 
links to the central government (Faccio, 2006). The names of government officers are coded from the 
website of the directory of Taiwan government (http://twinfo.ncl.edu.tw).  
 
Legislators and judges: For the parliaments, we coded the names of parliament members at the 
national level and the province level. We obtained the names of legislators from the parliament 
website (http://www.ly.gov.tw) as well as from newspapers. In addition, we included the names of the 
top officers in the judicial institution, the Judicial Yuan (http://www.judicial.gov.tw). While the 
judicial institution was not considered independent during KMT’s domination, its members might 
provide a linkage to the KMT and to administrative agencies.  
 
In total, we have 2,105 distinct names from business groups in 1986, 2,222 in 1990, and 3,453 in 
1994. We also have 2,066 distinct names from different political institutions in 1986, 1,137 in 1990, 
and 1,119 in 1994. A position interlock occurs when someone who holds a formal position in a 
business group also holds a formal political office. 
 
We took three steps in identifying social ties between business groups and the political actors. 
We first identified family/intermarriage ties. A group has such a tie if a top officer or major 
shareholder has a relative with the same family name (or a relative with a different family name but 
with a relationship via marriage) serving in the political institutions mentioned above. For example, 
Wang Yuzhen, the top officer of Hwa Eng Wire & Cable Group, has an elder brother Wang Yuyun, who 
used to be the mayor of Kaoshiung City (the second largest city in Taiwan) and a member of KMT 
central committee. Therefore, Hwa Eng Wire & Cable Group is coded as politically connected, with 
Wang Yuyun as the primary connection. Similarly, the Asia Trust Group is politically connected to 
Lian Zhan, the former chairman of KMT, through the intermarriage between one of Lian Zhan’s 
relatives and Zheng Mianmian, the president of Asia Trust Group.    45
 
Second, we identified close friend/same-hometown relationships. The group officers or large 
shareholders have close friends or have known people who are from the same home town, who are 
important figures in the political regime. An example is the long-lasting friendship between the 
founder of Taiwan Cement Group, Gu Zhenfu, and the President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-Hui, built while 
playing golf. Tainan Spinning Group is also politically connected to Wu Sanlian, a famous political 
figure who used to be the Taipei city mayor and a KMT central committee member, who is from the 
same hometown of Wu Xiuqi, one of the top executives of Tainan Spinning Group.  
 
Third, we identified trade associations/social clubs. The top directors or large shareholders of 
business groups have memberships in national trade associations and/or other prestigious social clubs 
that have significant political figures as members. For instance, the top officer of China Rebar Group, 
Wang Youzeng, has been the chairman of the Federation of Commerce, which is the peak trade 
association of the service industry. Another example is Cheng Shengtian, the top officer of the Sampo 
Group, is a member of a prestigious golf club, a usual gathering place for important business 
magnates and political leaders.  
 
We relied on three major sources for identification of informal relationships. First, the Excellent 
Business Database System (EBDS) (http://ebds.anyan.com.tw) is an electronic database that covers 
more than 200 periodicals and newspapers published in Taiwan and provides full-text search. Second, 
Wealth Magazine (‘Tsai Hsun’) database provides full-text of the magazine in a CD-Rom format. 
Wealth Magazine is an important business journal, which has periodical reports on large business 
groups in Taiwan. The style of extensive and deep coverage of this magazine is comparable to that of 
Fortune and Far Eastern Economic Review. We used the name of the top executive and shareholders 
of business groups to search the databases, and then screened the reports to locate the social ties to 
political figures. Third, we surveyed autobiographies of group founders and dissertations and books 
devoted to this topic (Hsu, 1991; Chen, 1999). 
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Appendix 2a. Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable Models 
(Dependent variable: Change in 2-digit SIC between period t and t+1) 




























































Formal position interlocks x Pre-







Formal position Interlocks x Post-













Informal social ties x Post-liberalization 















































































R-square 0.036  0.037  .042  .051  .034  .034 
Wald Chi2  166.05***  181.49***  169.53***  197.61***  149.63***  169.83*** 
N 246  246  246  246  246  246 
 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 (two-tailed test); # p<0.10 (one-tailed test). Standard errors are in parentheses.    47
Appendix 2b. Fixed Effects Heckman Selection Models 
(Dependent variable: Change in 2-digit SIC between period t and t+1) 
 




























































Formal position interlocks x Pre-
liberalization Dummy 






Formal position Interlocks x Post-















Informal social ties x Post-liberalization 
dummy  
  0.140 
(0.066) ** 
  0.859 
(0.210) *** 
  0.119 
(0.041) *** 








































































Wald chi2  415 ***  662 ***  610* **  718 ***  180 ***  609 *** 
N  313 313  313 313  313  313 
 
 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 (two-tailed test); # p<0.10 (one-tailed test). Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 